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THE REGULATORY ANTICOMMONS OF GREEN 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Development of green infrastructures (renewable energy plants and 
transmission networks) is urgently needed if significant reductions of 
greenhouse emissions are to be accomplished in the next few decades. 
But the huge financial investments required by these infrastructures 
will not be undertaken without a well-designed regulatory framework. 
This paper argues that barriers to the implementation of such a 
framework can best be understood by drawing analogies to the Law 
and Economics literature on anticommons. This analytic framework is 
employed to assess and criticize EU and US proposals to regulate 
planning and siting of green infrastructures. 
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THE REGULATORY ANTICOMMONS OF GREEN 
INFRASTRUCTURES* 
Giuseppe Bellantuono 
 
1. Introduction: regulating green infrastructures 
 
In October 2010 the Chairman of the German agency DENA 
made a scaremonger declaration: Germany’s aging power grid could 
collapse in the near future if the current trend of increasing the 
injection of solar power is not cut back quickly and drastically. 
Generous subsidies for renewable energy sources (RES) were 
described as the main cause for this unpleasant scenario.1 However, 
it is clear that subsidies are not the only problem. The unavailability 
of transmission infrastructure is at least as relevant as the 
distortionary effects of RES-supporting measures. The difference is 
that subsidies can be easily modified in the short term, while an 
infrastructure deficit can only be remedied with a sustained 
commitment in the medium-long term.  
The German example is interesting in itself because it comes 
from a country that in the last decades has been at the forefront of 
green investments. If one of the most successful attempts to increase 
                                                 
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the Sixth 
Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics, 
Bolzano, 8-11 December 2010. Thanks to participants for useful 
comments. Usual disclaimers apply. 
1 The declaration by Stephan Kohler, Chairman of the Deutsche 
Energie-Agentur GmbH (DENA), can be read at 
www.germanenergyblog.org , post of 19 October 2010. A few weeks later, 
this declaration was supported by the data published in the DENA Grid 
Study II (November 2010), showing that the need for new power lines by 
2015 had been satisfied only to a limited extent and that the new base 
scenario for 2020 asked for 3,600 km of new extra high voltage lines, at a 
cost of €9.7 billion. 
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the environmental sustainability of energy systems is now faced with 
severe grid stability problems, this is an alarm bell for any other 
national or international climate change policy.  
Cries for a complete overhaul of electricity transmission and 
distribution grids have been heard for a while. In the nineties the 
main argument was that existing networks were the legacy of the era 
of vertically integrated monopolies. Liberalization policies asked for 
the development of new power lines, both to knock down barriers 
preventing the entry of new energy players and to increase 
interconnections among formerly divided energy systems. Later on, 
when climate change policies came high on the political agenda, 
infrastructure development was invoked to allow the fullest 
exploitation of low-carbon technologies. In both cases, many new 
regulatory measures have been proposed and implemented. Sadly 
enough, their effectiveness in tackling the infrastructure deficit has 
still to be proved. Problems with grid stability are not a peculiar 
feature of the German system. In the EU, the cross-border 
interconnections which should support the ambitious goal of 
decarbonising the energy systems in a few decades are still in a 
project phase. At national level, most Member States are striving to 
overcome past failures which hampered RES integration within 
existing grids and market structures.  
The picture is no less gloomy on the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean. In the USA, a comprehensive federal policy on climate 
change has not been enacted so far. Hence, federal measures aimed 
at developing the electricity transmission networks have a narrow 
scope and are mainly of a financial nature. The federal energy 
regulator (FERC) is trying to exploit its powers to build a regulatory 
framework that eases the transition towards a greener energy system. 
Moreover, a large number of independent initiatives is going on at 
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regional and state levels. Whether this flurry of activities will have a 
significant impact on the overall rate of GHG emissions is difficult 
to foresee.2 
This paper tries to shed light on the reasons which obstruct 
attempts to foster the development of green infrastructures. I 
include in this definition both RES plants (e.g. onshore and offshore 
wind farms, small and large solar plants) and transmission grids.3 
The lack of an adequate regulatory framework for green 
infrastructures is especially worrisome in light of their peculiar 
characteristics. The most important ones are: a) a long time horizon 
(up to 40 years for power plants and more than 75 years for power 
lines); b) the lumpiness of the investments, usually undertaken in a 
relatively short period of time; c) the presence of externalities 
generated by cumulative mechanisms like increasing returns to scale, 
induced technological change, learning by doing or agglomeration 
economics. Taken together, these characteristics make it very costly 
to remedy mistakes in the initial choice of the infrastructure. If the 
stream of GHG emissions they generate is too high compared to 
available alternatives, this negative effect will be felt in the future for 
a long time. The presence of externalities will make it unlikely or too 
costly a shift to low-carbon infrastructures. Likewise, alternative 
solutions available in the future, like retrofit (reducing or eliminating 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., the preliminary assessments by R. Wiser and G. 
Barbose, Renewables Portfolio Standards in the United States: A Status 
Report with Data Through 2007, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
April 2008, 15 (under existing policies non-hydro RES will provide just 
6% of total US electricity generation by 2025); S. Carley, State Renewable 
Energy Electricity Policies: An Empirical Evaluation of Effectiveness, 37 
Energy Pol. 3071 (2009) (states adopting Renewable Portfolio Standard 
policies did increase total RES investment and deployment, but not the 
percentage of RES electricity generation). 
3 A different definition of green infrastructure is provided by the 
European Commission in its biodiversity strategy and in the policies aimed 
at maintaining and restoring ecosystem services: see 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/ecosystems/index_en.htm . 
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emissions from existing infrastructures with technological 
innovations) or closedown, may entail large costs.4 
At the most general level, many factors might affect the ability of 
a decision-maker to overcome inertia in the development of green 
infrastructures or to choose the infrastructure with the optimal level 
of GHG emissions. The decision-maker may simply ignore the 
probability of the catastrophic consequences of climate change, may 
consider only local damage and not global damage, may discount the 
future too heavily, or may be influenced by energy prices below the 
optimal level.5 Of course, the next question is what kind of 
institutional design is needed to improve on the decision-making 
capabilities of regulators. I suggest that this issue can be analyzed 
with the tools provided by the Law and Economics literature on 
ownership anticommons.6 More specifically, I suggest that planning 
                                                 
4 On the characteristics of  investments in low-carbon 
infrastructures see Z. Shalizi and F. Lecocq, Climate Change and the 
Economics of Targeted Mitigation in Sectors with Long-Lived Capital 
Stock, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5063, September 2009. 
On the costs of retrofitting and closedown see J. Strand and S. Miller, 
Climate Cost Uncertainty, Retrofit Cost Uncertainty, and Infrastructure 
Closedown: A Framework for Analysis, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 5208, February 2010.  
5 See the analysis by J. Strand, Inertia in Infrastructure 
Development: Some Analytical Aspects, and Reasons for Inefficient 
Infrastructure Choices, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5295, 
May 2010. Of course, for many other categories of infrastructure 
investments, causes like strategic misrepresentation and psychological 
biases contribute to underestimation of costs and overestimation of 
benefits: see B. Flyvbjerg, Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst 
Infrastructure Gets Built – and What We Can Do About It, 25(3) Oxford 
Rev. Econ. Pol. 344 (2009). The same problems plague investment in 
green infrastructures, but I suggest that the difficult assessment of costs 
and benefits in climate change policies adds another layer of complexity 
for the choice of governance structures. 
6 References to anticommons in the energy sector have already 
been made by the pioneer of this literature. See M. Heller, Gridlock 
Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops 
Innovation, and Costs Lives, Basic Books, 2008, xiv, 19-20 (difficulties 
with transmitting wind energy from states with high wind potential to 
coastal cities with the strongest demand for clean energy). See also H. 
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of green infrastructures can be managed more effectively if the 
underlying problem is described as one of coordination among veto 
players, much like a traditional ownership anticommons where each 
owner has the right to exclude others from using a privately held 
resource. 
The main advantage of the anticommons approach lies in its 
emphasis on the strategic posture of the multiple owners. Each of 
them tries to maximize her own utility function, but the final 
outcome of their uncoordinated decisions is underexploitation or 
underinvestment in the resource. Compared to the more traditional 
tragedy of the commons, anticommons display one similarity and 
one difference. In both cases, a collective action problem must be 
solved. The difference is in the direction of the inefficient behaviour: 
overexploitation for commons, underexploitation for 
anticommons.7  
The opposite tragedies of the commons and the anticommons 
offer a valuable analytic perspective for issues relating to the optimal 
use of a resource by a large number of stakeholders. I maintain that 
planning of green infrastructures fits in with this category. At a more 
immediate level, it is clear that new power lines and RES plants 
require a big shift of large quantities of natural resources (land, 
water, air, landscape) from traditional to alternatives uses. Therefore, 
each green infrastructure will encroach upon other stakeholders’ 
                                                                                                                     
Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance,  forthcoming 35 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. (2011), available at www.ssrn.com, 30-32 (identifying 
an anticommons in “renewable parcels” where wind and sunlight can be 
exploited). For anticommons in the siting of gas infrastructures see A.J. 
Durbin, Striking a Delicate Balance: Developing a New Rationale for 
Preemption While Protecting the Public’s Role in Siting Liquified Natural 
Gas Terminals, 56 Emory L.J. 507 (2006).  
7 It has been suggested that overexploitation is also possible in an 
anticommons, hence the real difference from the commons is the type of 
strategic interaction. See L.A. Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 907, 934-937 (2004). 
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rights. In many cases, each of them will be entitled to veto the 
project. But in a second and less straightforward meaning, the 
anticommons perspective can be extended to the design of the 
coordination mechanisms among the many types of regulators 
usually involved in the development of green infrastructures. 
Whereas the anticommons perspective is usually associated with 
property concepts, it also offers an additional analytic tool to 
regulation studies.8 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the 
regulatory measures for the development of green infrastructures 
proposed or implemented in three MSs. Sections 3 deals with the 
EU initiatives for cross-border planning and authorization. Section 4 
describes the regulatory measures and the debate on green 
infrastructures in the US. Section 5 explains why the concept of 
regulatory anticommons is the key to understanding the 
infrastructure deficit. At the same time, thissection deals with 
some theoretical issues raised by the analogy between ownership and 
regulatory anticommons. Section 6 offers some suggestions on the 
regulatory mechanisms which, according to the anticommons 
literature, have better chances of success in addressing coordination 
failures. Section 7 summarizes the arguments. 
 
 
2. Developing green infrastructures: planning and 
                                                 
8 There have been many other instances of cross-fertilization 
between property concepts and environmental regulation: see, e.g., C.M. 
Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental 
Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable 
Environmental Allowances, in E. Ostrom et al. (eds.), The Drama of the 
Commons, National Academy Pr., 2002, 223; D.H. Cole, Pollution and 
Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental 
Protection, Cambridge UP, 2002; D.H. Cole, New Forms of Private 
Property: Property Rights in Environmental Goods, in B. Bouckaert (ed.), 
Property Law and Economics, Elgar, 2010, 225.  
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authorization in EU Member States. 
 
At the most general level, the development of green 
infrastructures is dependent on a sequence of authorization 
procedures. They include the choice of the site where the 
infrastructure will be built, the issuance of all the permits related to 
construction and operation of the infrastructure, as well as its 
connection to the already existing grids. Many factors affect content 
and duration of authorization procedures, including the dimensions 
of the infrastructure, the characteristics of the geographic zone 
where it is placed and the number of stakeholders entitled to 
participate in the procedure or to oppose the project. In the last 
decade the EU has tried to avoid that delays in these procedures 
hamper the goal of decarbonising the energy sector. European 
interventions have been directed at both the national and the 
supranational level. More recently, many Member States (MSs) have 
independently adopted new measures to speed up and coordinate 
the authorization procedures. It is too early to assess their 
effectiveness, but in any case they only address infrastructure needs 
at national level.  
For the European level, available studies show that the measures 
enacted so far have not produced satisfactory results. It is hoped that 
the new measures included in the 2009 Third Energy Package will 
fare better. The proposed Infrastructure Package, to be discussed in 
the next section, is meant to boost the development of cross-border 
interconnections. For the purposes of this paper, it is interesting to 
note that the focus of EU policies on the legal-administrative 
barriers to green infrastructures closely resembles the description of 
a regulatory anticommons: many public authorities, communities 
and other stakeholders must give their assent to the project and can 
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exercise formal or informal veto rights. In the balance of this section 
I describe the main EU measures aimed at harmonizing 
authorization procedures at MS level. The next section discusses EU 
initiatives for cross-border infrastructures. 
The first RES directive (2001/77/EC) already asked MSs to 
review their procedures in order to reduce regulatory and non-
regulatory barriers to the increase of RES electricity production, to 
streamline and expedite procedures at the appropriate administrative 
level, to ensure that the rules are objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory, and take fully into account the particularities of 
different RES technologies (article 6). Transmission system 
operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs) were 
required to guarantee connection of RES plants according to 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria (article 7).  
Were these measures successfully implemented ? Only to a 
limited extent. Several reports by the European Commission show 
that MSs made little progress on the adoption of best practices for 
authorization procedures, namely one-stop authorization agencies, 
pre-planning mechanisms assigning locations for RES development, 
lighter procedures for small projects and guidance on the 
relationship with the European environmental legislation. Grid 
access was hampered by opaque procedures and by the lack of 
coordination between construction of RES plants and extension of 
grid capacity.9 
In keeping with claims on the central role played by 
administrative barriers, many studies have tried to compare 
authorization procedures at national level for different RES 
technologies. It has been shown that 85% of MSs do not have 
                                                 
9 See COM (2005) 627 fin. of 7 December 2005; SEC(2008)57 of 
23 January 2008; COM (2009) 192 fin. of 24 April 2009; SEC (2009) 503 
fin. of 24 April 2009.  
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effective one-stop shop authorization procedures, the number of 
permits ranges between one and forty, 40% of MS do not exempt 
small-scale systems from authorization, lead time for grid connection 
ranges between less than six months and over three years, 60% of 
MSs do not have efficient plans for the reinforcement of connection 
capacity within the country and of the interconnection capacity with 
neighbouring countries.10  
Much the same picture is displayed by other two studies. For 
wind power, the average number of authorities to be contacted 
directly or indirectly is 18 for onshore projects and 23 for offshore 
projects. Even the best performing countries require fewer than 10 
contacts in total, much higher than the recommended one-stop 
approach. Lead time for authorization procedures and connection is 
also much higher than the recommended 24 months, ranging on 
average between 54.8 months for onshore and 32 months for 
offshore.11 For large-scale photovoltaic systems, average duration of 
the project ranges between 50 and 231 weeks, while legal-
administrative costs can represent a share of overall project costs 
ranging between 8% and 47%.12 
The new RES directive (2009/28/EC), to be implemented by 5 
December 2010, includes provisions which should push MSs to 
reduce administrative barriers. According to article 13.1(a)-(f), 
certification and licensing procedures shall be clearly coordinated 
and defined, with transparent timetables for determining planning 
and building applications. Administrative procedures shall be 
streamlined and expedited at the appropriate administrative level. 
                                                 
10 See Ecorys, Assessment of Non-Cost Barriers to Renewable 
Energy Growth in EU Member States, Final Report, May 2010, available 
(together with national reports for the 27 MSs) at the DG Energy website.   
11 See Wind Barriers, Administrative and Grid Access Barriers to 
Wind Power, July 2010, available at  www.windbarriers.eu . 
12 PV Legal, First Status Report, July 2010, available at 
www.pvlegal.eu
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Simplified procedures shall be established for smaller projects and 
decentralized devices. Article 16 asks MSs to develop grid 
infrastructures to accommodate increases in RES electricity 
production. Moreover, authorization procedures for grid 
infrastructures shall be sped up and coordinated with administrative 
and planning procedures. Unlike the first RES directive, article 
16.2(b) asks MSs to provide for either priority access or guaranteed 
access. Additionally, TSOs and DSOs shall provide any new 
producer a reasonable indicative timetable for any proposed grid 
connection [article 16.5(c)].  
The implementation of these measures may improve on the 
present situation. The coordination between the development of grid 
infrastructures and planning procedures addresses one of the most 
vexing problems for effective RES integration. Moreover, the 
Commission has provided guidelines on the compatibility of wind 
farms development and some aspects of the EU environmental 
legislation.13 Although not binding, the guidelines can help to 
promote coordinated planning and reduce conflicts between 
divergent interests in authorization procedures.  
However, even the new RES directive did not compel the MSs 
to follow the best practices repeatedly recommended in 
implementation reports. This may come as a surprise. Why more 
advanced harmonization measures were not included ? Concerns for 
the subsidiarity principle are a plausible explanation. But they are 
only a partial one. After all, the EU energy policy has already 
imposed many constraints on MSs’ sovereignty. Binding 
commitments on the 2020 objectives will surely have a deeper 
impact on national energy systems than further modifications of 
authorization procedures. I advance the hypothesis that this aspect 
                                                 
13 See European Commission, Wind Energy Developments and 
Natura 2000, October 2010, available on the DG Environment website.  
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of national regulatory systems entails a difficult balancing exercise 
among competing interests. Which regulatory authorities should be 
involved, how vertical and horizontal competences should be 
distributed, how the goals of environmental protection  should be 
traded off with the development of energy markets, how broad 
should be the participatory rights of stakeholders, are all questions 
which admit a variety of answers. Moreover, there is a high 
probability that the answers will be strongly influenced by national 
administrative law. This means that the best practices for 
authorization procedures suggested by the Commission are but one 
of the possible regulatory options available to national legislators. A 
cursory glance to existing authorization procedures in three MSs 
(Denmark, UK and Italy) confirms that they all share the same goals 
(reducing delays and costs), but try to achieve them through 
different paths.  
Denmark is generally praised for its successful implementation 
of the one stop shop approach for wind farms. However, this 
country also displays a large number of peculiarities which explain 
why it was able to develop a strong domestic industry for wind 
turbines and to use it as a driver for wind power development.14 
Thanks to this national strategy, wind power has been widely 
supported with generous subsidy schemes and compensations for 
landowners, thus becoming more attractive than other RES 
technologies. In this favourable regulatory framework, streamlining 
of authorization procedures is an obvious consequence. Though, 
even in this case the effectiveness of such procedures depends on 
                                                 
14 On the factors which helped Denmark to become a world 
leader in wind technologies see, e.g., J. Buen, Danish and Norwegian Wind 
Industry: The Relationship Between Policy Instruments, Innovation and 
Diffusion, 34 Energy Pol. 3887 (2006); P. Karnøe and A. Buchhorn, 
Denmark: Path Creation Dynamics and Winds of Change, in W. M. 
Lafferty and A. Ruud (eds.), Promoting Sustainable Electricity in Europe, 
Elgar, 2008, 73. 
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the details of institutional choices. For example, the quick approval 
of offshore wind projects is heavily influenced by the strong 
selection effect of the large fines the developers have to pay if the 
project is not implemented within strict deadlines. The downside of 
this mechanism is that valuable projects become too risky and may 
not be proposed at all. Moreover, how the one shop stop approach 
is really implemented is directly related to the nature of the 
relationship among the stakeholders, which is in turn influenced by 
the national regulatory style. The Danish Energy Authority (DEA) is 
formally empowered with exclusive decision-making powers, but it is 
clear that the consultation process is directed at preventing conflicts 
and brokering a consensus position among all the interested 
stakeholders.15  
Another example of centralized authorization procedure can be 
found in the UK Planning Act 2008. For nationally significant 
infrastructure projects, the Act replaces the traditional procedure of 
public inquiries with a development consent order to be issued by 
the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC).16 The order must 
                                                 
15 At least six other authorities are usually “involved” in the 
authorization process for offshore wind turbine projects. See Danish 
Energy Authority, Wind Turbines in Denmark, November 2009, available 
at www.ens.dk . For descriptions of Danish authorization procedures see 
also the national report on Denmark in the Ecorys study, above note 10; 
Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program, China: Meeting the 
Challenges of Offshore and Large-Scale Wind Power, World Bank, May 
2010.  
16 While the Planning Act conceived of the IPC as an independent 
non-governmental body, the new coalition government elected in 2010 
will replace the IPC with a Major Infrastructure Planning Unit that will be 
part of the Planning Inspectorate within the UK Department of 
Communities and Local Government. This Unit will carry out broadly the 
same functions as the IPC, but final decisions will be made by Ministers 
based on the recommendations of the Unit. See the statement of the 
coalition government of 29 June 2010, the Draft Structural Plan published 
by the Department of Communities and Local Government in July 2010 
and the Infrastructure Plan 2010 published by the UK Treasury in 
October 2010.  
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follow the guidelines set out by the government in the National 
Policy Statements for each type of infrastructure. Such guidelines 
prevail over local plans. The order will cover any authorization 
required for building the proposed infrastructure, including rights to 
compulsorily purchase land.  The IPC can also provide a defence 
against any civil or criminal proceedings for common law or 
statutory nuisance.17 To ensure that all the affected interests are 
taken into account, two different consultation procedures must be 
carried out. In the pre-application stage, the developer shall consult 
relevant local authorities and any persons with an interest in land. 
After the application, the IPC shall start a new consultation and the 
local authorities shall submit a local impact report.  
The application should be decided within nine months. 
Compared to the previous authorization procedure, with many 
public bodies involved and longer time frames, the Planning Act is a 
clear improvement. But besides timing issues, it seems clear that the 
new procedure in intended to give due consideration to the interests 
opposing the infrastructure and to a large set of factors. The IPC 
shall take into account national, regional and local benefits as well as 
any environmental, social and economic impacts. Consent should be 
refused if the adverse impacts identified outweigh the benefits of the 
proposed development. Conditions can be imposed when they are 
necessary to make the proposed development acceptable in planning 
                                                 
17 However, the defence is available only to the extent that the 
nuisance is the inevitable consequence of what has been authorised. 
Moreover, the defence does not extinguish the local authority’s duties to 
inspect its area and take reasonable steps to investigate complaints of 
statutory nuisance and to serve an abatement notice where satisfied of its 
existence, likely occurrence or recurrence. The defence is not intended to 
extend to proceedings where the matter is prejudicial to health and not a 
nuisance. Finally, the IPC can impose requirements to mitigate or limit 
nuisances. See Department of Energy and Climate Change, Revised Draft 
Overarching National Policy Statement for Energy, October 2010, 65, 84f. 
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terms.18 Also relevant is the fact that planning decisions and 
transmission grid development are kept separate, the latter being 
under the control of the energy regulator Ofgem. All in all, the real 
benefits of the new procedure are tightly linked to a host of 
implementation details, including the scope of consultations, the 
human resources available to the IPC, and coordination with policies 
related to grid development and maritime infrastructures.19 These 
observations support the argument that the choice to assign most 
decision-making powers to a single body is just one piece of a much 
larger infrastructure strategy.  
In Italy two different mechanisms have been adopted to 
streamline and accelerate authorization procedures. The first is the 
Conference of Parties (COP). It allows the public body with the 
power to start the procedure (usually a region or a province, for 
offshore wind farms the ministry for Infrastructures) to convene all 
the other concerned public bodies and ask them to express their 
consent or denial within tight time limits. The convener issues the 
authorization taking into account the prevailing positions, which 
means that the decision does not require unanimity. However, 
according to the new rules introduced in 2010, motivated dissent 
from public bodies responsible for the protection of the 
environment, public health, or historical and cultural heritage, shifts 
                                                 
18 DECC, Revised Draft, above note 17, 44f.. 
19 See E. Gibson and P. Howsam, The Legal Framework for 
Offshore Wind Farms: A Critical Analysis of the Consents Process, 38 
Energy Pol. 4692 (2010). The parliamentary scrutiny on the draft national 
statements concluded that they should be coordinated with other ongoing 
reforms in the planning system and in the electricity markets. 
Recommendations were also made for more strategic spatial guidance in 
the development of energy infrastructures. See House of Commons, 
Energy and Climate Change Committee, The Revised Draft National 
Policy Statements on Energy, 26 January 2011. A discussion of methods 
for handling the environmental impact of offshore wind projects in the 
UK planning process is provided by D. Toke, The UK Offshore Wind 
Power Programme: a Sea-Change in UK Energy Policy ? 39 Energy Pol. 
526 (2011).  
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the final decision to the national government, even without the 
agreement of the interested local governments. At least in principle, 
the COP is a useful device to speed up the collection of a large 
number of different authorizations. Developers are also granted the 
right to ask for damages to the administrative judge when the time 
limits for the COP are not complied with.20 However, the 
effectiveness of such procedure in reducing lead time to put in 
operation a RES plant has been much debated. According to one 
European study, time spent for the administrative process is on 
average fifteen months (up to sixty months for wind farms), 
compared to the legislative time limit of six months. The number of 
public bodies involved can be very high, ranging between 15 and 
50.21  
As far as the national electricity networks are concerned, a single 
authorization procedure modelled after the consensual mechanism 
of the COP was introduced in 2003 and modified in 2004. However, 
in 2005 the Italian Constitutional Court denied the legitimacy of the 
provisions transferring to the national government the power to 
authorize the transmission infrastructure when the agreement with 
the regions cannot be reached. This means that in case of 
                                                 
20 The single authorization procedure for RES plants was adopted 
by art. 12, legislative decree 29 December 2003, n. 387 (implementing the 
first RES directive). It refers to the procedure for the COP regulated by 
art. 14ff. law 7 August 1990, n. 241. See also the guidelines on the regional 
authorization of RES plants adopted with ministerial decree of 10 
September 2010. Art. 4 of the legislative decree implementing the second 
RES directive will introduce shorter time limits for the single authorization 
procedure. For comments on the Italian authorization procedures see 
generally S. Fanetti, L’autorizzazione unica per la costruzione e l’esercizio 
di impianti alimentati da fonti rinnovabili, in B. Pozzo (ed.), Le politiche 
energetiche comunitarie: un’analisi degli incentivi allo sviluppo delle fonti 
rinnovabili, Giuffrè, 2009, 157; C. Mezzabarba, Profili critici nello 
sviluppo della produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili, ibid., 193; A. 
Macchiati and G. Rossi (eds.), La sfida dell’energia pulita - ambiente, clima 
e energie rinnovabili: problemi economici e giuridici, il Mulino, 2009. 
21 See Non-Cost Barriers to Renewables – AEON study: Italy, 10 
May 2010, 10f., available on the website of the DG Energy. 
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disagreement the controversy must be addressed to the 
Constitutional Court.22 It does not seem that this procedure has 
worked well. The Italian stakeholders claim that the grid has not 
been modernized in the last fifteen years. Its present status does not 
allow the connection of an increasing number of RES plants. 
Moreover, priority dispatch of wind farms is not guaranteed because 
of lack of capacity. Finally, lead time for getting grid connection is 
very long (between 6 and 30 months).23  
In 2010 the Italian government introduced a new procedure for 
energy infrastructures of strategic national relevance. The 
interventions are implemented through the cooperation between the 
special commissioners appointed by the national government and 
the local public bodies. The commissioners have the power to 
overcome inertia by the local bodies. When the agreement with the 
local governments cannot be achieved, the final decision on the 
interventions is taken by the national government.24 
While the example of Italy seems a paradigmatic case of 
regulatory anticommons, it also shows that insistence on the one 
shop stop approach cannot, in itself, provide satisfactory solutions 
when straightforward coordination mechanisms are not available. 
Both horizontal (among local bodies) and vertical (among national 
government and local bodies) interplay shall be explicitly managed to 
                                                 
22 See art. 1-sexies law 27 October 2003, n. 290; Italian 
Constitutional Court, decision of 14 October 2005, n. 383, Giur. Cost., 
2005, 3640. 
23 Non-Cost Barriers to Renewables – AEON study: Italy, above 
note 21, 43-45, 47-49. New provisions attempting to coordinate the 
authorization procedure for the RES plant and its connection to the 
network will be introduced by the legislative decree implementing the 
second RES directive. 
24 See art. 1 law 13 August 2010, n. 129. The previous attempt to 
appoint special commissioners (law 3 August 2009, n. 102) was deemed 
illegitimate by the Italian Constitutional Court because it did not justify the 
transfer of powers from the regions to the state when the investment is to 
be undertaken  by private parties: see the decision of 17 June 2010, n. 215. 
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avoid that conflicts among different categories of public and private 
interests end up in stalemate. The Italian example also shows that 
national institutional constraints (in this case, the constitutional 
allocation of concurring legislative powers to the state and the 
regions in energy matters) make it very difficult to suggest uniform 
solutions for all MSs. 
 
3. Planning and authorization for EU cross-border 
infrastructures. 
 
While imposing a single point of equilibrium for authorization 
procedures in all the EU will lead to unnecessary controversies, there 
is space for European interventions when cross-border 
infrastructures are needed. In the past fifteen years, the TEN-E 
program has been the main policy instrument. Following the 
mandate of articles 154-156 EC Treaty, now confirmed by articles 
170-172 TFEU, energy infrastructures of European interest have 
been selected for financial support. However, the TEN-E program 
displayed many weaknesses: co-financing could not exceed 1% of 
the total investment cost for each project, only a handful of listed 
projects have been completed, there was a lack of provisions 
addressing coordination and differences in authorization procedures. 
Only the new 2006 guidelines provided for the appointment of 
European Coordinators, whose role is to mediate in strategic cross-
border projects to resolve practical difficulties.25 
Acknowledging that the TEN-E program will not deliver the 
                                                 
25 See decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-
European energy networks; European Commission, The Implementation 
of the Trans-European Energy Networks in the Period 2007-2009, COM 
(2010) 203 fin. of 4 May 2010. See also P. Buijs et al., Seams Issues in 
European Transmission Investments, 23(10) Elec. J. 18 (2010). 
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results expected by liberalization and climate change policies, the EU 
institutions are now trying to design new tools aimed at supporting a 
truly pan-European energy infrastructure. The electricity regulation 
(EC) No. 714/2009 asks the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators (ENTSO-E) to publish a Community-wide 
network development plan every two years (article 8). The plan shall 
take into account both the ten-year network development plans 
submitted by each TSO at national level (article 22 directive 
2009/72/EC) and the regional investment plans published every two 
years (art. 12 reg. 714/09). The Community-wide plan and the 
regional plans are not binding. However, enforcement powers are 
given to national regulators (NRAs) to ensure that the planned 
investments are actually executed (article 22.5-8 dir. 72/09). 
Moreover, the Agency for the cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) monitors the contents and implementation of the 
Community-wide plan, as well as the regional cooperation among 
TSOs. The ACER can issue a reasoned opinion or recommendations 
to ENTSO-E and EU institutions if the plan does not contribute to 
non-discrimination, effective competition, the efficient functioning 
of the market or a sufficient level of cross-border interconnection 
(article 6.4, 6.8-9 reg. (EC) No. 713/2009). 
The ENTSO-E published its first pilot Community-wide plan in 
June 2010. However, it was criticized on the ground that it 
amounted to no more than a list of investment projects, without any 
clear model of the future European grid.26 The pilot Community-
wide plan addresses explicitly the issue of authorization procedures. 
It complains that the whole procedure for new power lines can take 
up to 20 years. Recommended improvements include integrated 
                                                 
26 See the joint declaration by Eurelectric and EWEA of 10 June 
2010, as well as the ENTSO-E report on received comments, 21 May 
2010.  
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procedures, to be centralized at national level, effective time-limits, 
and explicit support in national laws for TEN-E projects, with 
infrastructure corridors to be reserved for those projects.27 
The lack of an adequate regulatory framework for cross-border 
networks is widely acknowledged in most studies on the 
development of the European grids. Attempts to develop European 
interconnections within well-defined priority corridors entail a 
strong cooperation among NRAs and an advanced level of 
harmonization for planning and authorization procedures, 
methodologies for cost allocation, market structures and congestion 
management.28 Similarly, the EU goal of at least 80% lower GHG 
emissions by 2050 entails a major expansion of interconnection 
capacity among the national transmission networks and the 
coordinated operation of a trans-European wholesale power market. 
These big accomplishments can be achieved only if ENTSO-E and 
ACER are given the mandate to collect MSs’ longer term forecasts 
and develop a strategic interconnection plan aimed at minimising the 
resource costs of decarbonisation across Europe. An improved 
regulatory regime should also be developed to fund the new 
infrastructures and enable the costs to be shared equitably across 
European consumers who will all benefit from the reduced energy 
costs and increased system security. Moreover, to avoid the delays 
usually associated with authorization procedures, pre-approved 
planning areas for strategic low carbon assets could be singled out.29 
                                                 
27 See ENTSO-E, Ten Year Network Development Plan 2010-
2020, 28 June 2010, 279-283. See also ENTSO-E, Position Paper on 
Permitting Procedures for Electricity Transmission Infrastructure, 29 June 
2010.   
28 See Ramboll Oil & Gas and Mercados, TEN-Energy Priority 
Corridors for Energy Transmission, Part Two: Electricity, November 
2008, available on the website of DG Energy.  
29 See European Climate Foundation, Roadmap 2050: A Practical 
Guide to a Prosperous, Low-Carbon Europe, volume 2, Policy 
Recommendations, April 2010, available at www.europeanclimate.org . 
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The Commission had already decided to move along this path 
with its Second Strategic Energy Review and the Green Paper on 
European Energy Networks, both published in 2008.30 At the end 
of 2010, the new Infrastructure Package began to take shape.31 A 
blueprint for strategic planning was put forward. For electricity 
networks, four priority corridors were identified.  These priorities 
will then be translated into projects. They will be awarded the label 
of “Project of European Interest” and subject to special rules for 
their implementation. More specifically, the tools proposed by the 
Commission include the delegation of planning tasks to the existing 
Regional Initiatives or to ad hoc regional structures, streamlined 
authorization procedures, improvement of cost allocation rules and 
optimization of EU’s leverage of private and public funds. 
The streamlined procedure shall be designed as follows. A single 
national authority will serve as interface between project developers 
and public authorities. This authority would be in charge of 
coordinating the entire permitting process. For cross-border 
projects, the possibility of coordinated or joint procedures is left 
open. A time-limit for the procedure could be set up. After its 
expiry, special powers to adopt a final positive or negative decision 
within a set timeframe could be given to an authority designated by 
the concerned MSs. Requirements for compensation of the affected 
                                                                                                                     
For other proposals see S. Andoura et al., Towards a European Energy 
Community: A Policy Proposal, Notre Europe, 2010, 111-113 (proposing 
the creation of independent regional executive energy agencies, exclusively 
competent for the development of cross-border networks); P.A. Boot and 
B. van Bree, A Zero-Carbon European Power System in 2050: Proposals 
for a Policy Package, Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands, April 
2010, 82f., available at www.roadmap2050.eu (ACER could be delegated 
the task of promoting the development of a European zero carbon 
infrastructure). 
30 COM (2008) 781 fin. of 13 November 2008 and COM (2008) 
782 fin. of 13 November 2008. 
31 COM (2010) 677 fin. of 17 November 2010 and the 
accompanying impact assessment SEC (2010) 1395 fin. .    
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populations, together with rewards and incentives where timely 
authorization is made easier, could be included.  
These proposals will be translated in more specific rules with the 
Energy Security and Infrastructure Instrument, to be tabled in 2011. 
But there is enough material to advance two observations. Firstly, 
the present situation of green infrastructures in the EU displays all 
the characteristics usually associated with an anticommons. 
Secondly, the Commission’s proposals attempt to reduce the costs 
of authorization procedures and avoid delays, but it is not clear 
whether there is complete awareness of the extent and nature of 
coordination problems.  
As far as the characteristics leading to an anticommons-type 
situation are concerned, it is clear that each public body involved in 
the authorization process can block the final approval of the project. 
This means that there is perfect complementarity among all the 
public bodies. Anticommons can also arise when complementarity is 
less than perfect, for example because some uses of the resource are 
still possible without the consent of other stakeholders. But 
anticommons located at the extreme of perfect complementarity are 
harder to deal with.32 Additionally, the higher the number of 
stakeholders with veto powers, the larger the losses from 
underutilization of the resource.33 Finally, authorization of green 
infrastructures resembles the situation of a sequential anticommons, 
where the decision of each stakeholder to exercise her veto right or 
not is made in successive stages. Non-simultaneous decisions have 
some advantages in reducing the losses from underutilization. If the 
                                                 
32 See the model proposed by F. Parisi et al., Duality in Property: 
Commons and Anticommons, 25 Int. Rev. L. & Econ. 578, 585 (2006). 
The same idea can be expressed through a reference to production 
functions, with lumpy or step goods requiring all the contributions to 
deliver the surplus. See Fennell, above note 7, 956-961. 
33 See N. Schulz et al., Fragmentation in Property: Towards a 
General Model, 158 J. Inst. & Theor. Econ. 594, 600 (2002). 
  
 
This paper is published in the  
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Research Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00001964/ 
26 
first mover decides not to exclude, the second mover can reap the 
benefits of this positive externality and decide to pursue the 
common project. Knowing this, the first mover will decide not to 
exclude to obtain her share of profits from the common project.34 
However, underutilization is still possible when the first mover 
decides to exclude because she is unable to obtain the full revenue 
from her investment. Hence, devising a process which aligns the 
preferences of the public bodies involved is the main hurdle to 
overcome in sequential anticommons. 
Strict complementarity and the large number of veto players 
explain why it has been difficult to solve the problem of delay in 
authorization procedures. But heterogeneity of preferences among 
public bodies is another crucial factor. The goal of GHG reduction 
must be somewhat balanced with environmental protection and land 
planning. This means that the bargaining process modelled in 
examples of ownership anticommons, where each rightholder is 
interested in maximizing her utility, shall be modified in settings 
involving public bodies. We shall come back to this point in section 
5. 
The Commission’s proposals fall short of the centralized 
authorization procedure invoked, among others, by ENTSO-E. The 
impact assessment suggests that harmonization of permitting 
procedures with final decision-making powers to the EU level would 
not be compatible with the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity. But the streamlined national procedure will only be 
successful if new and more effective coordination mechanisms will 
be implemented. Only a handful of MSs have made some progress 
on this count, and only for national infrastructures.  
In the last few years, some voluntary initiatives for the 
development of cross-border infrastructures have been 
                                                 
34 See Schulz et al., above note 33, 603f.. 
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undertaken.35 Besides their limited geographic scope, these 
initiatives introduce new coordination mechanisms. For example, the 
Memorandum on the North Seas Grid Initiative provides for a 
Steering Committee, a Programme Board and three working groups, 
covering the areas of grid configuration and integration, market and 
regulatory issues, planning and authorization procedures. The main 
goal is to improve the coordination among projects by increasing 
awareness of existing barriers and proposing solutions. However, 
there isn’t any transfer of regulatory powers to new administrative 
structures at regional level. The signatory states are left full 
discretion to accept the proposed solutions or not.  
A further step ahead towards cross-border coordination could 
be the new role that the Commission envisages for the Regional 
Initiatives (RIs).36 They were set up in 2006 to support the 
implementation of the Single Energy Market with a bottom-up 
approach. In the December 2010 communication, the Commission 
proposes to strengthen their effectiveness in two ways. Firstly, the 
priorities of the RIs should be clearly established. They include the 
implementation of the Third Package, promoting cross-border 
                                                 
35 The more advanced experiences of voluntary cross-border 
cooperation for transmission planning can be found in the Nordic 
countries (see, e.g., Nordreg, Grid Investments from a Nordic Perspective: 
Nordreg Recommendations, 2010), in the North Seas (see the Political 
Declaration of the North Seas Countries Offshore Grid Initiative of 7 
December 2009 and the Memorandum of Understanding of 2 December 
2010), and in the Baltic countries (see the Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan of 17 June 2009). 
36 See the Commission’s communication on the future role of 
Regional Initiatives, COM (2010) 721 fin. of 7 December 2010. See also 
ERGEG, Strategy for Delivering a More Integrated European Energy 
Market: The Role of the ERGEG Regional Initiatives, 21 May 2010 
(supporting the view that the RIs will change the nature of their work 
from a voluntary process to the implementation of European 
requirements); Everis and Mercados, From Regional Markets to a Single 
European Market, Final Report, 28 April 2010 (advancing the 
recommendations on policy guidance and the Governmental Committee 
that the Commission has included in its December 2010 communication). 
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investments and pilot testing on issues not covered by framework 
guidelines and network codes. Secondly, new governance 
mechanisms should be adopted. The main changes are the direct 
involvement of MSs, ACER and the Commission in the Regional 
Steering Committee and the supervisory role of ACER in order to 
ensure the coherence of work programmes in each RI. In this case, 
too, the driving force behind the Commission’s proposal is the 
enhancement of communication channels among MSs and 
stakeholders. But regulatory implementation is still a national matter. 
The strengthening of RIs will increase the effectiveness of their 
decision-making process only if they will be able to design reference 
models for cross-border issues which represent an acceptable 
compromise from the point of view of MSs’ interests. 
 
     4. Developing green infrastructures in USA. 
 
Much like the European one, the American regulatory 
framework for planning and siting of green infrastructures is in a 
state of flux. As far as RES plants are concerned, regulatory 
jurisdiction is entirely in the hands of state and local authorities. 
However, the federal government regulates the authorization 
procedures for RES development on the lands it owns and for 
offshore wind farms in the Outer Continental Shelf.37 We shall see 
                                                 
37 See Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 
Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of Existing Facilities on the Outer 
Continental Shelf: Final Rule, April 29, 2009, 30 CFR Parts 250, 285 and 
290. See the description of the authorization procedure in NREL, Large-
Scale Offshore Wind Power in the United States: Assessment of 
Opportunities and Barriers, September 2010, 138-150. See also the ‘Smart 
from the Start’ wind energy initiative for the Atlantic OCS, US DOI press 
release, November 23, 2010 (aiming at identifying priority Wind Energy 
Areas for potential development, improving coordination with local, state, 
and federal partners, and accelerating the leasing process). The White 
House’s Executive Order 13547 of 19 July 2010 led to the formation of 
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that, according to some authors, a broader involvement of the 
federal level for large-scale RES plants might have beneficial effects. 
Siting of transmission networks falls within state jurisdiction, too, 
but the federal level (the Congress and the FERC) is striving to 
extend its reach. In what follows I describe the authorization 
procedures for both types of green infrastructures. It seems clear 
that the spectre of anticommons problems looms large in the multi-
layered US regulatory framework. Those problems are often tackled 
with the tools of federalist doctrines. But the latter offer vague 
prescriptions and leave room for alternative interpretations. 
Hopefully, the anticommons perspective suggests how to assess the 
pros and cons of different governance structures.  
Starting with the authorization procedures for RES plants, a 
wide array of solutions can be observed in the US states. In many 
cases, each local public body (town or county) is free to set the 
requirements for authorizing RES plants and to decide where they 
can be built. This option reflects a traditional distribution of land 
planning powers within the US, with the lower level of government 
delegated to exercise them without major constraints from the upper 
state level.38 However, local regulation is becoming increasingly 
unsatisfactory. More often than not, towns and counties set up 
conflicting requirements. Additionally, large-scale plants span the 
                                                                                                                     
the National Ocean Council, whose role is to strengthen ocean 
governance and coordination across the federal government.  Regarding 
federal lands, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandated the designation of 
corridors for electricity transmission and distribution facilities in the 11 
contiguous Western States. In the designated corridors, interagency 
operating procedures provide the industry with a streamlined application 
process: see Bureau of Land Management, Approved Resource 
Management Plan Amendments/Record of Decision for Designation of 
Energy Corridors on Bureau of Land Management-Administered Lands in 
the 11 Western States, January 2009. 
38 See generally S. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: 
Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 
231 (2008). 
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territory of many towns and can even cross state boundaries. This 
means that many different public bodies are involved in the 
authorization process and can independently decide to impose their 
own requirements or stop the project outright. Of course, many 
different communities and land owners are directly or indirectly 
affected and can oppose the project.39  
Several remedies have been tried to speed up and coordinate 
authorization procedures. The milder one takes the form of 
voluntary state guidelines or model ordinances that local 
governments may follow. An intermediate option is to split siting 
authority, moving to state level the task to decide about larger plants. 
Finally, some states chose to adopt streamlined procedures following 
the one stop shop approach. However, only in some cases (e.g. 
California and Minnesota) local regulations are totally preempted. In 
other cases the state body simply acts as single reference forum for 
the applicants, but it must ensure that all local regulations have been 
complied with.40  
While there seems to be a general trend towards centralization of 
planning and siting procedures at state or regional level, how they 
should be designed is still open to debate. Different degrees of 
involvement of lower government levels, as well as of other 
stakeholders, are possible. Likewise, centralization in itself does not 
                                                 
39 As observed by Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable 
Governance, above note 6, 31, the lack of a clear hierarchical authority 
among the many public bodies involved is a defining characteristic of an 
anticommons. On this aspect see M. Heller, The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in The Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 621, 670-673 (1998).  
40 See the survey of state regulations by R.H. Rosenberg, Making 
Renewable Energy a Reality – Finding Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 
32 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol. Rev. 635 (2008); AWEA, Siting 
Handbook, February 2008; P.E. Salkin, Renewable Energy and Land Use 
Regulation (Part 2), ALI-ABA Business Law Course Materials J. 27 (2010); 
Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, above note 6, 26-
30, 51-53; U. Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, forthcoming  Stan. 
Envtl. L.J. (2011), 24-36, available at www.ssrn.com .   
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answer the more difficult question, that is how concerns for 
competing objectives (GHG emissions reduction, environmental 
preservation, health protection, alternative land uses) should be 
balanced.  
Two other proposals are worth mentioning. The first suggests a 
federal wind siting policy that provides regulatory uniformity, but 
without totally preempting local regulations. In the spirit of 
cooperative federalism, a national siting policy would reduce 
application and compliance costs which stymie wind energy 
development. At the same time, local regulations would take into 
account the geographical and cultural characteristics of the areas 
where the plants will be built. More specifically, this proposal argues 
that the federal wind siting policy should: a) prohibit bans on wind 
energy facilities; b) require decisions by local governments within a 
reasonable time; c) require that such decisions are supported by 
substantial evidence.41  
These contents are not much different by those forwarded in the 
November 2010 communication of the European Commission. In 
both cases, the aim is to coordinate the higher and the lower levels 
of government. The Commission’s proposal is more explicit in 
asking for the adoption of the one-shop stop approach. It also 
suggests that guidelines on compensations and financial rewards 
could be provided. The most relevant difference is how remedies for 
non-compliance with these guidelines are designed. The Salkin-
Ostrow proposal suggests that the courts should adopt a heightened 
standard of judicial review, ensuring that scientific evidence and 
overall project benefits have been carefully considered. The 
                                                 
41 P.E. Salkin and A.P. Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and 
Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 Hofstra L. Rev. 
1049, 1080-1096 (2009). The proposal follows the approach already 
adopted for the siting of cellular communication towers by the US 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
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Commission’s proposal suggests that, in case of delay, a designated 
authority could be given the power to issue the final decision. No 
indications are provided on standards of judicial review, which are 
left to MSs. However, if a EU legislative act is issued, the European 
Court of Justice could give its interpretation on the scope and 
breadth of judicial review by MSs’ courts. 
The second proposal argues in favour of new Regional Energy 
Boards with the power to issue permits for green infrastructures. 
The idea is to avoid the fragmentation of exclusion rights by 
concentrating in a single body all the regulatory powers existing at 
federal, state and local level. These boards would be the only forum 
where exclusion rights can be exercised by interested stakeholders. 
In case of conflict, compromise standards could be agreed upon. 
When compromise is not possible, preemption of local, state and 
federal laws may be necessary. The main advantage would be to 
establish a clear hierarchy among the exclusion rights of interested 
parties, so as to avoid the paralyzing effect of the anticommons.42  
The Regional Energy Boards have some points of contact with 
the European Commission’s proposal to delegate planning tasks to 
the RIs. However, in the EU constitutional framework there is a low 
probability that these regional are turned into independent 
regulators. At best, they could work as coordination mechanism. 
Enforcement powers are jealously guarded at national level. This 
means that the Commission’s proposal represents only a partial 
solution to the problem of fragmented exclusion rights.  
I now turn to transmission siting and planning in US. The states 
have exclusive jurisdiction.43 However, the FERC can regulate 
                                                 
42 Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, above 
note 6, 53-60. 
43 In most states local public bodies were preempted by 
centralized procedures. But even where this solution was embraced there 
is much procedural variation from one state to another. See A.C. Brown 
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interstate electricity transmission. Traditionally, federal powers were 
addressed to network access and tariffs. More recently, the FERC 
stepped in the transmission planning arena.  
In 2007 FERC Order No. 890 required transmission providers 
to adopt a planning process complying with nine principles.44 While 
useful in some respects, this Order did not address the problems of 
regional planning. Transmission providers were only asked to 
coordinate with interconnected systems to share system plans and to 
identify system enhancements that could relieve congestion or 
integrate new resources. However, the federal regulator made it clear 
that there was no duty to undertake investments identified in 
transmission plans.  
When climate change came high on the presidential agenda, the 
federal regulator started to propose more aggressive solutions. The 
notice of proposed rulemaking issued by FERC on 17 June 2010 
aims at strengthening coordination for both intraregional and 
interregional facilities and at adopting a more detailed cost allocation 
methodology. Transmission providers are required to participate to 
regional planning processes that meet the same principles already 
established by Order No. 890. Both local and regional planning 
processes should account for public policy requirements established 
by state or federal laws and regulations. Transmission planning 
                                                                                                                     
and J. Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving 
Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional 
Considerations, 81 Colo. L. Rev. 705 (2010); S. Porter and K. Fink, State 
Transmission Infrastructure Authorities: The Story So Far, 22(2) Elec. J. 
30 (2009). Statistical analyses show that siting difficulty varies widely 
among states and that public opposition has a stronger impact than 
regulation and environmental considerations: see S.P. Vajjhala and P.S. 
Fischbeck, Quantifying Siting Difficulty: A Case Study of Transmission 
Line Siting, 35 Energy Pol. 650 (2007). 
44 The nine principles are: 1) coordination, 2) openness, 3) 
transparency, 4) information exchange, 5) comparability, 6) dispute 
resolution, 7) regional participation, 8) economic planning studies, 9) cost 
allocation for new projects.   
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agreements must be entered into among neighbouring regions. 
Finally, default principles for allocating the costs of intraregional and 
interregional facilities in a manner which is roughly commensurate 
with the distribution of benefits are established.  
At the end of 2010 these proposals were still in the consultation 
phase. They have engendered much opposition from several 
quarters. Although the federal regulator claims that the proposal 
leaves much flexibility in the design of the planning process and 
does not infringe upon state authority, it is clear that the new 
requirements force all transmission providers to participate to 
regional and interregional processes. The end result could be close to 
what some legislative proposals on transmission planning pending in 
the Congress are trying to accomplish. 45 However, there is a heated 
debate on the best way to coordinate state and federal powers. For 
example, state regulators claim that the FERC does not have 
jurisdiction on transmission planning. Moreover, its June 2010 
proposal would have other detrimental effects: regional planning 
                                                 
45 In the American Clean Energy and Security Act 2009 (the 
Waxman-Markey bill), H.R. 2454, passed by the House of Representatives 
on 26 June 2009, sec. 151 asks the FERC to issue national planning 
principles. Adhesion to the principles is voluntary. Plans inconsistent with 
national principles can be returned for further consideration. New and 
extended backstop authority (replacing state authority in case of inaction) 
is granted to the FERC only in the Western Interconnection. Different 
solutions on siting and backstop authority are proposed in other five bills 
pending in the US Senate and House of Representatives (S. 539, S. 774, S. 
807, S. 1462 and H.R. 2211). For critical discussions see  Brown and Rossi, 
Siting Transmission Lines, above note 43, 741-748 (observing that many 
legal barriers to new transmission infrastructure are not addressed by 
pending federal proposals); J. Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power 
Transmission Siting Authority, 39 Env. L. 1015, 1039ff. (2009) (criticizing 
expansion of federal authority on transmission siting); Noor, Herding 
Cats: What to Do When States Get in the Way of National Energy Policy, 
11(1) N.C. J. L. & Tech. 145, 163-166 (2009) (describing federal proposals 
on transmission siting); T. Benedetti, Running Roughshod ? Extending 
Federal Siting Authority Over Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 47 
Harv. J. Legisl. 253 (2009) (arguing in favour of preserving state input and 
authority in the grid planning and siting processes).  
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authorities could pursue policies not embedded in state or federal 
regulation, or reduce the possibility for states to implement their 
own policies on generation and integrated resource plans. Any 
attempt to shift to the regional level the power to authorize 
transmission lines is firmly rejected.46 
Interestingly, an alternative framework for regional transmission 
planning is slowly emerging. At the end of 2009 the US Department 
of Energy awarded $60 billion from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act to support collaborative long-term analysis and 
planning for the Eastern, Western and Texas electricity 
interconnections. The awards will fund both transmission planners, 
for the development of project options, and state agencies, for the 
development of coordinated interconnection priorities and planning 
processes.47 It seems that this bottom-up approach is able to avoid 
the controversies arising from the FERC’s attempt to impose a 
mandatory regional planning process.48 Moreover, these regional 
collaborations resemble many other experiences of translocal 
organizations of government officials, which in the last decades have 
                                                 
46 See NARUC’s comments of 29 September 2010 in FERC 
Docket RM10-23-000. Other reactions to the FERC’s proposal are 
discussed by D. Bloom et al., Current Conflicts in U.S. Electricity 
Transmission Planning, Cost Allocation and Renewable Energy Policy: 
More Heat than Light ?, 23(10) Elec. J. 8 (2010). 
47 See the press release of December 18, 2009 by the US 
Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Memorandum of 
Understanding between DOE and FERC.  For an overview of state and 
regional initiatives so far see A. Schumaker et al., Moving Beyond 
Paralysis: How States and Regions Are Creating Innovative Transmission 
Policies for Renewable Energy Projects, 22(7) Elec. J. 27 (2009). 
48 Lurking in the background of this debate are contrasting visions 
for the twenty-first century grid. In 2009 ten East Coast governors and 
five West governors publicly opposed the idea of the transmission 
superhighway (on which see AWEA and Solar Energy Industries 
Association, Green Power Superhighways: Building a Path to America’s 
Clean Energy Future, February 2009, available at www.awea.org ), 
proposing instead to study alternatives to transmission and to support 
local development of RES.  
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furthered national policies without direct involvement by the federal 
government.49 
Of course, there is no guarantee that a voluntary process 
involving a large number of stakeholders will succeed in delivering 
the expected grid expansion within a reasonable time. However, 
without further legislative interventions the federal authority on 
transmission planning and siting is severely constrained. If enacted, 
the FERC’s proposal would start a period of protracted litigation 
with a very uncertain final outcome. Voluntary participation in 
transmission planning may be the only credible alternative for the 
US transmission system.  
The Regional Energy Boards discussed above are one among 
many different governance structures which the states could employ. 
From the point of view of US constitutional law, agreements among 
states that delegate regulatory tasks to regional bodies would be 
interstate compacts, to be authorized by Congress (Article I, par. 10, 
cl. 3 US Const.). While this additional layer of approval could 
increase the complexity of multistate agreements, an interstate 
compact would ensure a more durable collaboration and bind the 
states to enforceable obligations. Moreover, once authorized by 
Congress, the intestate compacts become federal law. Therefore, 
they can be insulated from FERC’s initiatives or future climate 
change federal legislation. At the same time, they prevail over 
conflicting state laws.50 
                                                 
49 By adding another regulatory layer, translocal organizations go 
beyond the traditional division of competences between the federal and 
the state level. See J. Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: 
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government 
Actors (TOGAs), 50 Arizona L. Rev. 709 (2008). 
50 See R.K. Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and 
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 
81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 771 (2010); Noor, above note 45, 169-174 (suggesting 
that the Congress should strengthen incentives to participate to interstate 
compacts). There is currently one interstate compact, The Northwest 
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      5. From ownership to regulatory anticommons. 
 
The discussion in the three previous sections suggests two 
observations. Firstly, the development of green infrastructures fits 
the main characteristics of anticommons-type situations. Exclusion 
rights held by many different stakeholders must be coordinated to 
move existing resources from their present use to a new one. Those 
resources are strictly complementary because they must be used 
together to allow the construction of a RES plant or a new power 
line. As mentioned above, with strict complementarity strategic 
interactions could lead to inefficient underutilization of resources.  
Secondly, attempts in the EU and US to adopt new 
authorization procedures are meant to shift exclusion rights. If the 
one shop stop approach and regional planning are implemented on a 
large scale, they will increase the probability that the goals of climate 
change policy will prevail over other interests like environmental 
conservation and autonomy of local governments in deciding about 
land use. This is not to say that those interests will be completely 
discarded. However, the new procedures will strengthen the position 
of those advocating green infrastructures, while at the same time 
weakening the position of those opposing them.  
These symmetric effects stem from the reorganization of 
entitlements and are another distinguishing feature of 
anticommons.51 While the new procedures try to remedy the actual 
                                                                                                                     
Power and Conservation Council, which could take up transmission 
planning tasks, but it is more probable that new interstate compacts will be 
needed to reflect the optimal geographic scope of transmission planning. 
See National Council on Electricity Policy, Coordinating Interstate 
Electricity Transmission Siting: An Introduction to the Debate, July 2008, 
17f.. 
51 On the “virtual inevitability” of fragmentation see Fennell, 
Common Interest Tragedies, above note 7, 966-971. 
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fragmentation of exclusion rights, which delays or blocks green 
infrastructures, they also introduce a new fragmentation, this time 
making it more difficult to oppose green infrastructures. To be sure, 
centralizing planning and siting powers in a single body can be 
perceived as a clear improvement on widely dispersed exclusion 
rights. Both advocates and opponents of green infrastructures can 
present evidence supporting their arguments in the same forum. 
Neither group is forced to bargain with many different stakeholders, 
each entitled to strategically hold out its consent to extract a larger 
share of the surplus. But the final decision of the authorizing body 
will inevitably override the interests of one group. Provided that 
such decision favours the optimal use of the resources, their tragic 
underutilization is avoided. Though, controversies surrounding 
alternative visions of future energy systems (e.g, transmission 
superhighways versus distributed generation) show that there will be 
widely divergent opinions on the meaning of optimal use. Hence, 
depending on individual and group preferences, the new 
authorization procedures can be perceived as another form of 
anticommons.  
In the remaining part of this section I address two issues. Firstly, 
to what extent the analogy between ownership anticommons and 
regulatory anticommons is justified ? I discuss recent scholarship 
taking issue with such analogy, but conclude that it does not 
undermine the core arguments supporting it. Secondly, I claim that 
the dynamics of bargaining are well understood in ownership 
anticommons, but require a more extended analysis in regulatory 
anticommons.  
Take up the credibility of the analogy first. Since the beginnings 
in late nineties, the anticommons literature has placed situations 
involving multiple owners and multiple regulators on the same 
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plane.52 However, such extension has been contested by some 
authors, both from the point of view of the meaning and content of 
ownership and of its policy implications. 
Firstly, it has been argued that anticommons arise in a far more 
limited number of cases than Heller suggests.53 On this account, 
there is an anticommons when at least two owners have independent 
but overlapping authority over the same resource. That is, they must 
be granted exactly the same right over the resource. In contrast, the 
anticommons perspective should not be extended to situations in 
which an owner cannot pursue its ends because of the opposition of 
owners of complementary goods or regulators. In the latter two 
cases, there isn’t overlapping authority over the same resource 
because neither the owners of complementary goods nor the 
regulators have the right to set the agenda for the resource. Likewise, 
regulatory anticommons can be observed only when two or more 
regulators have been granted exactly the same mandates, but not 
when they have complementary mandates.54  
It should be noted that this interpretation does not deny that the 
                                                 
52 See Heller, Gridlock Economy, above note 6, 26 (extending the 
anticommons concept to fragmented decision making). For other 
examples of regulatory anticommons see R. Dibadj, Regulatory Givings 
and the Anticommons, 64(4) Ohio St. L.J. 1041 (2003); F. Parisi et al., 
Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 26 Int. Rev. L. & Econ. 56 
(2006); L.R. Kosnik, From Cournot to the Commons: An Analysis of 
Regulatory Property Rights, working paper,  2010, available at 
www.ssrn.com . 
53 See L. Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 Can. J. L. & Juris. 99 
(2010). See also E.R. Claeys, Gridlock, Exclusion, and Exclusivity, 
forthcoming 53 Arizona L. Rev. (2011), 24-26 (arguing that ownership 
gridlock is different from regulatory gridlock because in the latter the 
regulators further non-property interests public goals), available at 
www.ssrn.com .  
54 In the same vein, Kosnik, From Cournot to the Commons, 
above note 52, 13-14, proposes a model in which the regulators have 
overlapping authority over the same set of goals. However, she does not 
rule out the possibility of extending the model to include regulators with 
multiple preferences. Overlapping jurisdictions are also assumed by Parisi 
et al., above note 52. 
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presence of non-owners or multiple regulators can lead to an 
increase of transaction costs and to holdout problems. However, 
their causes cannot be traced back to the structure of ownership (too 
many veto rights), but simply to a suboptimal distribution of 
decision-making authority. Hence, anticommons are singled out as a 
narrow instance of the broader category of problems usually 
associated with high transaction costs and holdout.   
But why give such a narrow definition of anticommons ? The 
first reason has to do with the meaning of ownership, whose content 
cannot be identified with exclusion rights, as Heller seems to 
suggest. But another and deeper reason has to do with the horizontal 
relationship among owners or regulators. Insofar as they have 
complementary rights or mandates, there might be coordination 
problems, but there is not an anticommons problem. On this view, 
the optimal number of owners and regulators should be judged 
according to the competing values to be pursued, and not by 
assuming a deficiency in the structure of authority.  
This perspective has the advantage of avoiding an anti-regulation 
slant, which in turn could lead to the simplistic advice of reducing 
the number of regulators. As we have seen, proposals for green 
infrastructure planning sometimes fall prey to just this kind of bias. 
But criticisms against overbroad extensions of the idea of regulatory 
anticommons should not be meant to imply that the latter is a 
useless analytic tool. On Katz’s account, the agenda-setting authority 
of owners cannot be equated with regulatory interventions. While 
the former entails the right to decide about resource use, the latter is 
only an external constraint. The distinction relies on an explicit 
dichotomy between private law and public law powers. Whatever its 
usefulness in settings which involve both private owners and 
regulators, it does not provide a careful description of those settings 
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which only involve a plurality of regulators. Even though their 
mandates are completely different or only partially overlapping, none 
of them is able to accomplish its goals without coordinating with all 
the other regulators.55 According to Katz, only perfect overlapping 
leads to anticommons. But the coordination costs must also be 
incurred when overlapping is less than perfect. Hence, the same 
strategic interaction can be observed in situations with different 
degrees of complementarity. Even though an appeal to the concept 
of anticommons does not supply ready-made solutions for the 
optimal distribution of authority, it helps locate the case of 
infrastructure planning in the wider class of coordination problems 
and find out the type of barriers to be overcome.  
Another objection to the idea of regulatory anticommons relates 
to its policy implications for the interplay between private property 
and regulation.56 Whereas Heller suggests that too much private 
property is the ultimate cause of anticommons, Epstein counters 
that too much or inefficient regulation is to blame. These contrasting 
views are relevant for the discussion on green infrastructures. They 
lead to very different policy recommendations. In the anticommons 
perspective, the main problem should be identified in the veto rights 
of owners or regulators who can block the approval and completion 
of green infrastructures. In the perspective suggested by Epstein, the 
main problem is the permitting system which gives to a large 
number of competing interests the possibility to interfere with the 
project without showing actual harm or paying the price for the 
under-used resource. Of course, debates on the type of interests to 
                                                 
55 For a typology of patters of regulatory interaction characterized 
by jurisdictional overlap and dependence see R.B. Ahdieh, Dialectical 
Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863 (2006).  
56 R.A. Epstein, Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why 
There Is Too Little, Not Too Much, Private Property, forthcoming 53 
Arizona L. Rev. (2011), available at www.ssrn.com . 
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be considered and the weight to be assigned to each of them are not 
easily solved. But the regulatory anticommons perspective has still an 
advantage over the competing perspective: it clearly shows that the 
central issue is the coordination of different stakeholders. This 
insight is lost in the story told by Epstein, who leads one to believe 
that reducing the number of interests to be considered is the best 
way to avoid the anticommons. 
While the analogy between ownership and regulatory 
anticommons seems well grounded, there are some adjustments to 
be made. The dynamics of bargaining in the context of a regulatory 
anticommons should be better understood. This means that two 
aspects shall be explored: the preferences of the regulators and the 
type of transaction costs they face in their coordination efforts.  
As far as the preferences of regulators are concerned, the 
anticommons literature usually follows public choice theory and 
assumes that each regulator is interested in maximizing its rent.57 
This means that strategic bargaining among regulators can be 
modelled much in the same way as in ownership anticommons. In 
the latter, each owner tries to extract the larger share of surplus; in 
the former, each regulator tries to obtain the larger rent.  
However, alternative assumptions about the preferences of 
regulators may be equally plausible. For example, the decisions of 
regulators are directly dependent on the amount and quality of 
information they possess, how they frame the issues at stake, the 
kind of horizontal and vertical relationship with other regulators. 
This means that in a regulatory anticommons the level of 
                                                 
57  See, e.g., Parisi et al., above note 52, 60 (identifying regulators’ 
payoff with rent extraction or the degree to which each regulator achieves 
his regulatory mission); R.S. Sobel and P.T. Leeson, Government’s 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127 Public 
Choice 55 (2006) (self-interested bureaucrats created a centralized 
decision-making structure for disaster relief which ended up in a tragedy 
of the anticommons).  
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cooperation could be higher or lower than expected, depending on 
the impact of the above mentioned factors. More complex 
motivations should be assumed than simple rent-maximization.58  
Experimental studies on individual behaviour in anticommons 
provide a starting point for the assessment of regulators’ 
preferences. It has been shown that strategic behaviour (asking 
higher prices to transfer a part of a unitary resource) is more 
probable when there is perfect complementarity and when the 
payoffs to the third party purchaser are framed as losses to the 
owners. Moreover, people seem to be less cooperative in 
anticommons scenarios than in commons ones. Several 
psychological factors might explain this outcome. For example, the 
anticommons scenario may elicit a preference for individual 
rationality and lessen concerns for collective interests. Relatedly, an 
anticommons owner may perceive she is exercising her own right to 
veto or to exclude and may not realize that such behaviour harms 
other owners. Finally, commons and anticommons situations may 
also differ from the point of view of the perceived severity of the 
consequences stemming from noncooperative behaviour.59 
Without additional research, these results can hardly be 
                                                 
58 See R.L. Scharff, A Common Tragedy: Condemnation and the 
Anticommons, 47 Nat. Resources J. 165, 175f. (Winter 2007), who argues 
that the mixed  motives of regulators, together with the public availability 
of information about developers’ rents, make it more difficult to solve the 
problem of regulatory fragmentation than the problem of ownership 
fragmentation.  
59 See B. Depoorter and S. Vanneste, Putting Humpty Dumpty 
Back Together: Experimental Evidence of Anticommons Tragedies, 3 J. L. 
Econ. & Pol. 1 (2006); S. Vanneste et al., From “Tragedy” to “Disaster”: 
Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 26 Int. Rev. 
L. & Econ. 104 (2006); A. Van Hiel et al., Why Did They Claim Too 
Much ? The Role of Causal Attribution in Explaining Level of 
Cooperation in Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 38(1) J. Appl. 
Soc. Psychology 173 (2008). In real-life land deals, too, it is often difficult 
to distinguish strategic holdouts from other psychological motivations: see 
G. Parchomovsky and P. Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and 
Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 75 (2004). 
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generalized. But a few observations are in order. It can be safely 
assumed that framing effects are also at work in regulatory decision-
making. For example, each regulator develops its own understanding 
of the priorities within its jurisdiction. This means that it can come 
to different conclusions on the severity of consequences which 
might ensue if it refuses to cooperate. With divergent priorities and 
divergent frames, each regulator may simply try to accomplish its 
mandate without worrying about the larger picture. 
Whereas this observation seems to point to a heightened  risk of 
noncoperative equilibria in regulatory anticommons, it is important 
to note that the experiments mentioned above exclude any type of 
communication, bargaining or informal sanctions for 
noncooperative behaviour. All three mechanisms are usually 
available in regulatory settings. This means that in regulatory 
anticommons there could be a higher probability that the severity of 
the consequences is rightly understood. Moreover, communication 
and informal sanctions tend to favour cooperative behaviour.60 
Regulators’ preferences are also relevant from the point of view 
of the design of streamlined authorization procedures. If the 
approval of concurrent regulators is needed, rent-seeking behaviour 
will lead to a lower than optimal level of green infrastructures 
development. A higher surplus could be obtained with alternative 
approval by independent regulators. But when the shirking 
behaviour of bureaucrats is the problem, concurrent regulation helps 
distribute the costs of approval (the first regulator approving the 
project generates a positive externality for the others) and may 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., A. Falk et al., Appropriating the Commons: A 
Theoretical Explanation, in E. Ostrom et al. (eds.), The Drama of the 
Commons, above note 8, 157; D. Balliet, Communication and 
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review, 54 (1) J. 
Conflict Res. 39 (2010).  
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improve the decision-making process.61 
What about the transaction costs impacting on bargaining in 
regulatory anticommons ? Their nature is directly dependent on the 
type of strategic interaction. In game theory terms, anticommons can 
be described as coordination games.62 When the players share the 
same preferences, they will generally converge to one of the efficient 
Nash equilibria. This is the simplest case, in which the only barrier to 
coordination is lack of communication. For green infrastructures, a 
pure coordination game can be observed when two countries agree 
on the construction of an electricity interconnector which benefits 
both.  
But things are rarely that simple. In other coordination games 
the parties have conflicting preferences. In the milder form of 
conflict (exemplified by the battle of the sexes), they are still 
interested in choosing the same strategy, but each player would 
prefer a different strategy. For example, investment in RES plants 
could be deemed desirable by all the involved regulators. However, 
they might disagree on the choice of the technology, the size of the 
plants or their location. In the stronger form of conflicting 
preferences (exemplified by the Hawk-Dove game or Chicken 
game), the players prefer different strategies. For example, some 
regulators might fiercely oppose green infrastructures because they 
fear their negative environmental impact, or because there are 
alternative infrastructures to consider.  
Whatever the form of coordination games, it is clear that 
expectations on other players’ behaviour are the main factor leading 
                                                 
61 See the analysis by Parisi et al., above note 52, 63-65. 
62 See Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, above note 7, 946-
949; R. B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the 
Regulatory State, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 578 (2010). On legal applications of 
coordination games see also R.H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 209 
(2009). 
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to convergence to the efficient or the inefficient equilibrium. Hence, 
proposals to streamline authorization procedures should be 
understood more as attempts to redirect expectations than as 
coercive mechanisms aimed at modifying the incentives faced by 
each regulator. New expectations should be fostered to overcome 
two types of barriers: firstly, barriers hampering the decision to 
coordinate with other regulators; secondly, barriers hampering the 
decision to change the existing equilibrium.63  In the case of green 
infrastructures, the decision to coordinate with other regulators may 
be delayed or discouraged because of the uncertainty about the costs 
and benefits of RES plants or new power lines. Alternatively, the 
existing fragmentation of regulatory powers can lock in the status 
quo and prevent wide-scale planning. Whether any type of barrier 
will actually lead to the coordination failures associated with an 
anticommons depends on how the institutional context aligns the 
expectations of regulators and designs the relationship among them. 
In turn, interventions on that relationship are constrained by the 
legal principles which each national or supranational legal system 
employs to define the jurisdictional lines among levels of 
government. As we have seen, in the EU centralized infrastructure 
planning at supranational level was already discarded in the impact 
assessment of the November 2010 communication. In the US, 
mandatory regional planning is met with strong opposition by the 
states. This means that there is a limited set of institutional 
mechanisms available in each legal system to manage the regulatory 
anticommons. Because of these constraints, answers to 
anticommons may well differ both from the point of view of the 
type of coordination they try to implement and from the point of 
view of their effectivess. 
                                                 
63 For this distinction between front-end and back-end challenges 
to coordination see Ahdieh, The Visible Hand, above note 62, 629-631.  
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      6. Avoiding the tragedy of regulatory anticommons in green 
infrastructures. 
 
The main message of the anticommons literature is that 
fragmentation of regulatory powers is inevitable and can be very 
costly. At the same time, studies on ownership anticommons clearly 
show that tragic outcomes can be avoided. Most often cited 
solutions include assembly tools (e.g. in oil fields and 
condominiums), forced aggregation through eminent domain, social 
norms in close-knit groups, using nonprofit organizations to solve 
environmental or intellectual property anticommons.64 
The theory of remedies to regulatory anticommons is much less 
developed. It would be unwise to propose all-encompassing 
solutions to be applied across to board in every country and to every 
green infrastructure. As the description of European and American 
initiatives has shown, the design of planning and authorization 
procedures is usually influenced by the characteristics of existing 
institutions, as well as by the structure and maturity of the RES 
industries. Effective solutions shall be tailored to local conditions. 
Though, the literature on anticommons suggests at least two general 
principles which should guide any attempt to develop green 
infrastructures. There are probably many different ways to 
implement them, but they at least suggest the direction which 
policymakers should head for. Both principles have to do with scale 
issues.65 The first principle refers to the management of 
                                                 
64 See Heller, Gridlock Economy, above note 6, 193-202. See also 
A. Bell and G. Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1015 (2008) (arguing that problems 
with too many owners can be managed with changes in the content of 
ownership rights and their territorial extension). 
65 For a definition of scale challenges see D.W. Cash et al., Scale 
and Cross-Scale Dynamics: Governance and Information in a Multilevel 
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geographical and jurisdictional scales. The second principle refers to 
temporal scales. 
Let us consider geographical and jurisdictional scales first. There 
is a wide dispersion of regulatory powers and many different levels 
of government are involved. This means that the key factor is how 
vertical and horizontal relationships are managed. Moreover, green 
infrastructures require lumpy investments with a long lifecycle. This 
means that the optimal decision-making process must be in place at 
the beginning of the investment period and cannot be built 
incrementally. As we have seen, the most obvious solution usually 
called for by policymakers is the concentration of authorization 
procedures in the hands of a single body. However, institutional 
fragmentation is almost inevitable. Even new regulatory bodies, 
purposefully created with the goal of streamlining procedures, are 
rarely granted an exclusive competence: they usually perform a 
coordination function. Moreover, centralization is often prone to 
distortions worse than those it should cure.  
If the number of regulators cannot be reduced, the 
anticommons literature suggests that other dimensions of the 
regulatory framework can be manipulated. More specifically, the 
content of regulatory powers can be changed according to the scale 
of resource use. Additionally, the relationship among regulators can 
be designed to take into account both simultaneous uses and 
sequential uses. We will deal with each of these dimensions in turn. 
Proposals related to the scale of resource exploitation start from 
the observation that most of the times there are parallel uses of the 
resources which require different entitlements. For example, private 
ownership of land is the best solution for small events, but larger 
events require bigger governance structures.66 Much the same 
                                                                                                                     
World, 11(2) Ecol. & Soc. 8 (2006). 
66 See R. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315 (1993); 
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observation can be made for green infrastructures. Lower levels of 
government are able to deal with RES plants of small size or with 
distributed generation, while large plants and cross-border 
interconnections require system-wide planning.  
An anticommons tragedy is usually the consequence of a 
mismatch between optimal scale and distribution of entitlements.67 
The same can be said for the fragmentation of regulatory powers. 
Therefore, those powers should be distributed in such a way as to 
better align with the different uses of resources. In other words, the 
new distribution of powers should help address the front-end 
coordination problem faced by those regulators who must choose a 
cooperative or a defection strategy. Here the idea of alternative 
regulators can be useful to manage the different scales of 
intervention. It means that the decision-making process for green 
infrastructures should provide for at least two different avenues to 
start and complete an authorization procedure. The first-level 
procedure should start at local or country level, depending on the 
size of the infrastructure. But a second-level procedure, at country or 
supranational level, should also be available whenever the first-level 
procedure is delayed or blocked.  
This institutional design has several advantages. Building 
                                                                                                                     
L.A. Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, forthcoming in 
K. Ayotte and H.E. Smith (eds.), Research Handbook on the Economics 
of Property Rights, Elgar, 2011, available at www.ssrn.com ; L.A. Fennell, 
Scaling Property with Professor Ellickson, 18 Wm. & M. Bill of Rights J. 
173 (2009). 
67 See Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, above 
note 66, 30-37. It is important to note that multiscalar problems with 
positive and negative feedbacks across scales cannot be addressed with a 
simple-minded application of the matching principle, i.e. that the scale of 
governance should be matched to the scale of the externalities: see J.B. 
Ruhl and J. Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems 
in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 
59, 100-102 (2010). 
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redundancy in the regulatory system helps to overcome inertia.68 
Further, the fact that the first-level procedure can be replaced by the 
second-level procedure ensures that there will be constant 
monitoring and exchange of information among levels. Finally, this 
institutional design is able to weaken resistance to shifts of 
competences from the lower levels of governments. The latter 
maintain their regulatory powers, provided that they are timely 
exercised. 69  
Of course, no institutional design is able to completely avoid 
noncooperative behaviour and free riding. Moreover, success is 
crucially dependent on details about the role to be played by each 
level and the structure of coordination mechanisms.70 What is 
important to stress here is that the two-layered institutional design 
suggested above is partially different from current proposals in EU 
and US. Both maintain that just one regulatory layer is needed and 
                                                 
68 Ahdieh, above note 55, 885-890. W.W. Buzbee, Recognizing 
the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 
1 (2003) argues that overlapping regulatory jurisdiction may lead to the 
opposite effect of underregulation because of blame and problem 
attribution, diluted credit claims, information costs and status quo 
preservation incentives. However, his analysis mainly focuses on issues 
where the primacy of one regulator has not yet been established or 
jurisdictional boundaries are blurred.  
69 This is the main advantage of polycentric systems: see E. 
Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and 
Global Environmental Change, 20 Global Environmental Change 550 
(2010).  
70 See, e.g., G.R. Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-
Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level, 2(1) Int. J. 
Commons 75 (2008) (discussing lessons for increasing effectiveness of 
environmental governance in multi-level systems); J. Gupta, Global 
Change: Analyzing Scale and Scaling in Environmental Governance, in 
O.R. Young et al. (eds.), Institutions and Environmental Change, MIT Pr., 
2008, 225 (discussing reasons for scaling up and down and the ensuing 
costs and benefits); C.J.A.M. Termeer et al., Disentangling Scale 
Approaches in Governance Research: Comparing Monocentric, 
Multilevel, and Adaptive Governance, 15(4) Ecol. & Soc. (2010) (analyzing 
different responses to multiscale problems); Ruhl and Salzman, Climate 
Change, above note 67, 102-108 (discussing theories of dynamic 
federalism, new governance and transnational networks).   
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do not provide clear solutions for the relationship between the 
different levels. On the European side, the authorization procedure 
is concentrated at the MS level, but it is not clear how the 
relationship with local governments will be managed or whether 
mechanisms remedying inertia or delay will be effective. A broader 
role for planning cross-border infrastructure will be attributed to the 
RIs, but how their activities will be coordinated with authorization 
procedures is unclear. In the US the proposed mandatory regional 
planning does not leave room for voluntary collaborations among 
states and does not provide any guidelines for the relationships 
between state and local levels of governments. 
Regarding the temporal scale, the main aspect to consider is the 
availability of coordination mechanisms for both simultaneous and 
sequential uses. As far as simultaneous uses are concerned, what is 
needed is a decision-making process which is able to give a balanced 
assessment of all the factors favouring or opposing the development 
of a green infrastructure. If they are authorized too easily, there is a 
high probability that one regulatory anticommons is replaced by 
another, this time increasing the costs of bundling the resources for 
alternative uses. From this point of view, two requirements of the 
decision-making process should be underlined. The first is the 
transparency and openness of the procedure to all the interested 
stakeholders. Of course, the availability of a single forum greatly 
simplifies communication and reduces its costs. The second 
requirement is judicial review of the final decision with substantive 
criteria, which should increase confidence on the fairness of the 
outcome. 
Regarding sequential uses, the main problem is to avoid that the 
chosen destination of the resources cannot be changed if it becomes 
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inefficient over time.71 Two interventions on the authorization 
procedures could be useful. The first is a tight coordination between 
land planning and building of green infrastructures (both RES plants 
and power lines). This is the best way to avoid overlooking 
information which suggests the concrete risk of rapid obsolescence 
of the proposed infrastructures. The European proposal suggests 
that the priority corridors could increase coordination in the 
planning phase for some cross-border infrastructures. But the issue 
of coordination with national authorization procedures is left 
unaddressed.  
The second intervention is the explicit provision for restoration 
duties should the infrastructure cease its operations. Several national 
provisions already ask for insurance or bonding obligations as a 
condition to grant building licences to green infrastructure 
developers.72 
 
          7. Conclusions.  
 
        Large-scale investments in green infrastructures are needed to 
achieve the goals set by climate change policy in the next few 
decades. Both the lumpiness of such investments and the dramatic 
consequences of delays in reducing GHG emissions point to the 
need to quickly implement planning and authorization procedures 
                                                 
71 This is the familiar lock-in problem of coordination games: see 
Ahdieh, above note 62, 630f.. 
72 In the UK, where the IPC decides to grant consent for a 
proposed offshore wind farm, it should include a condition requiring the 
applicant to submit a decommissioning programme to the Secretary of 
State before any offshore construction works begin. See Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, Revised Draft National Policy Statement for 
Renewable Energy Infrastructure, October 2010, 32. See also sec 105 UK 
Energy Act 2004.  In the US financial assurance requirements for offshore 
wind farms are provided in the 2009 MMS regulations (above note 37), 
sec. 585.515-517. 
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which allow a significant increase of RES energy shares. However, 
both EU and US are still far from having adopted a regulatory 
framework which is suitable to the needs of sustainable energy  
systems. The main problem can be identified in the fragmentation of 
regulatory powers, leading to the coordination problems already 
pointed out in the Law and Economics literature on ownership 
anticommons. The paper has shown that analogies between the two 
types of anticommons can be helpful both to identify barriers to 
cooperation and to highlight possible remedies. The anticommons 
literature can also be employed to criticize the reform proposals 
recently submitted by EU and US institutions. Two improvements 
have been suggested. Firstly, acknowledge the advantages of 
alternative authorization procedures to overcome inertia and delay. 
Secondly, provide comprehensive planning and restoration measures 
to avoid lock in to inefficient equilibria. 
        Of course, the analogy between ownership and regulatory 
anticommons cannot be taken too far. The main differences can be 
identified in the description of the preferences of individual owners 
and regulators and in the nature of transaction costs to be overcome. 
This means that in regulatory anticommons modelling the payoffs 
and the strategies of the coordination game becomes more complex.  
